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Introduction 
It is sometimes argued that the strength in mod- 
els that assume rational expectations is the weak- 
ness of their competitors. For example, McCallum 
(1980) says: "Each alternative expectational 
hypothesis, that is, explicitly or implicity posits 
the existence of some particular pattern of system- 
atic expectational error. This implication is unat- 
tractive, however, because expectational errors 
are costly. Thus, purposeful agents have incen- 
tives to weed out all systematic components." 
This alluring intuition, however, 
glosses over a very difficult problem that remains 
unsolved in general: How do  agents acquire the 
information and understanding ~~cient  to enable 
them to "weed out" systematic error?  The acquisi- 
tion of information is costly and no one actually 
believes anyone knows the true underlying model 
of the economy. Discovering systematic error is 
one thing; knowing what to do  about it is 
another. The central issue is one of learning. 
The problem of learning in models 
that assume rational expectations has received 
increasing attention lately.'  The approach taken 
in many papers treats stability of equilibrium as a 
problem in learning. That is, the issue of conver- 
gence to rational expectations equilibrium (REE) 
is presumed tantamount to the question of how 
agents acquire sufficient information to weed out 
For  a concise review of these models see Blume,  Bray, and  I  1  EasIey(l982). 
systematic expectational error. While several 
modeling approaches have found such "stability" 
under different and reasonably plausible assump- 
tions, there are no general theorems. More 
importantly, however, even the limited results 
found in these models presume continuous 
market clearing. Thus, the meaning of stability is 
quite restricted. The fundamental issue-how 
individual behavior will lead to the necessary 
price adjustment-is never explicitly modeled. 
Neglect of this issue is not new; it has long hin- 
dered progress in general equilibrium theory. 
The purpose of this paper is to ex- 
amine carefully the assumptions about individual 
behavior required for stability in models where 
agents learn to form rational expectations.  Section 
one provides a restatement of the importance of 
stability analysis for deriving meaningful results 
fiom equilibrium models, and introduces the 
idea of developing learning models to describe 
the transition process to systemic equilibrium. 
To illustrate the correspondence 
between learning processes and stability of REE, 
two examples are presented. The first, presented 
in section two, presumes rational agents know 
the structure (that is, the functional form) of the 
true economic model, but not the parameters. 
The example presented in section three pre- 
sumes agents don't even know the model struc- 
ture while they are learning. The precise meaning 
of stability in both models is discussed in section 
four. A distinction is made between expectational 
equilibrium and equilibrium of the aggregative 
economy. In section five, we discuss the difficul- 
ties facing the researcher who seeks to model 
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learning in an aggregative economy. The issues 
are developed in a general model employing a 
notion of equilibrium proposed by Frank Hahn 
(1973). Section six offers concluding remarks. 
I.  Importance of Stability 
Analysis of positions and characteristics  of equilib- 
rium is by far the most widely accepted mode of 
economic analysis. Typically, such equilibria are 
derived from (or presumed to be) the solution of 
individual optimization problems. A key hypothe- 
sis that begets coordination of individual plans 
(aggregative consistency) is that certain 
variables-usually prices-take on values that 
make all individual plans mutually consistent. 
Under these circumstances, no individual has any 
incentive for further change. Economists rarely 
specify a behavioral process that could account 
for how variables, like prices, adjust to recoordi- 
nate individual plans when conditions change. 
Rather "changes" in equilibrium outcomes are 
generally developed in comparative static anal- 
ysis, which compares equilibria corresponding to 
different values of underlying parameters. 
The use of comparative statics in 
economics was first explained in rigorous detail 
by Samuelson (1947). He recognized, however, 
that to obtain definite operationally meaningful 
theorems in comparative statics, one has to spec- 
ify a hypothesis about the dynamical properties 
that will lead to equilibrium values. The 'duality' 
between the problem of stability and the prob; 
lem of deriving fruitful theorems in comparative 
statics is what Samuelson called the Correspon- 
dence Principle. 
The importance of dynamical foun- 
dations has recently been restated by Fisher 
(1983). He argues that if general equilibrium 
models are to be of any use then we must have 
some confidence that the system is stable,  that is, 
that it must converge to an equilibrium, azd that 
such convergence to equilibrium must take place 
relatively quickly: 
If  the predictions of comparative statics are 
to be interesting in a world in which con- 
ditions change, convergence to equili- 
brium must be sufficiently rapid that the 
system, reacting to a given parameter shift, 
gets close to the predicted new equilib- 
rium before parameters shift once more. If 
this is not the case, and a fortiori, if  the 
system is unstable so that convergence 
never takes place, then what will matter 
will be the 'transient' behavior of the sys- 
tem as it reacts to disequilibrium. Of 
course, it will then be a misnomer to call 
such behavior 'transient' for it will never 
disappear. (p. 3) 
Fisher goes on to emphasize his 
point in the context of models assuming rational 
expectations: 
In such models, analysis generally pro- 
ceeds by finding positions of rational 
expectations equilibrium if  they exist. At 
all other points, agents in the model will 
have arbitrage opportunities; one or 
another group will be able systematically 
to improve its position; ....  The fact that 
arbitrage will drive the system away from 
points that are not rational expectations 
equilibria does not mean that arbitrage will 
force the system to converge to points that 
are rational expectations equilibria. The lat- 
ter proposition is one of stability and it 
requires a separate proof. Without such a 
proof-and, indeed without a proof that 
such convergence is rapid-there is no 
foundation for the practice of analyzing 
only equilibrium points of a system which 
may spend most or all of its time far from 
such points and which has little or no ten- 
dency to approach them. (pp. 3-4) 
Fisher argues that analysis of this 
problem requires a full-dress model of disequilib- 
rium -  one that is based on explicit behavior of 
optimizing agents.'  A general model would 
accommodate trading, consumption and produc- 
tion while the model is out of equilibrium. That 
is, such an approach would provide a theoreti- 
cally based alternative to the Walrasian auctio- 
neer. Arbitrage would follow from individual 
rationality. Unfortunately, practitioners of this 
approach have not advanced the subject enough 
to address the stability of model-consistent (that 
is, of rational) expectations. 
The stability of REE  has been 
addressed, extensively, however, on a less fun- 
damental level. This approach presumes that 
markets clear and that REE  is the true underlying 
long-run equilibrium. It examines different pro- 
cesses by which agents might acquire (learn) the 
information necessary for an expectations equilib- 
rium consistent with ME. An  important paper by 
Cyert and DeGroot (1974) defends the use of 
models of the learning process: 
The attempt to develop process models 
immediately opens us to the criticism of 
developing ad hoc  models. We acknowl- 
edge that there may be a large number of 
models that could potentially describe the 
process to equilibrium. Our position is 
Fisher (1983) does make a contribution in this direction but only  2  under the assumption of perfect foresight  His monograph illus- 
trates the burden that lies ahead of any serious theoretician in this 
matter. 
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that, while the models have a certain 
amount of face validity, our major contri- 
bution is the introduction of an explicit 
learning process described in Bayesian 
terms. The notion of developing models to 
describe the transition process toward 
equilibrium of a system disturbed by some 
random shocks may be questioned by 
some economists. The development of 
comparative statics and the neglect of 
dynamic analysis is in part a reflection of 
such attitudes in the profession. Yet with- 
out well-developed process models, the 
concept of rational expectations is essen- 
tially a black box. (p. 522) 
Thus, models of the learning pro- 
cess are essentially provisional tools that enable 
us to interpret REE in a more realistic way. We 
may think of the development of such models as 
an attempt to justify the use of the rational expec- 
tations hypothesis. 
These models, at the very least, 
allow us to ask if it is conceivable that agents 
could "learn their way" to equilibrium in the 
model at hand. This problem is not simple. 
Because agents are presumed to base their deci- 
sions on their own estimates of a model's 
parameters, their actions cannot be considered 
exogenous to parameter estimation. If  estimates 
of parameters change, agents adjust their behav- 
ior accordingly. Moreover, agent actions generate 
the data on which the estimates of parameters are 
made, making learning an endogenous process. 
To correctly specify the model, agents would 
need to take the endogeneity into account. Con- 
ventional econometric techniques are typically 
not well-suited for this task. 
The question of convergence to REE 
has been examined in two frameworks. The first 
assumes that agents know the functional form of 
the model or, at least, the appropriate specifica- 
tion of the likelihood function underlying the 
generation of the data. In this framework, agents 
are presumed to learn about the value of param- 
eters either through classical statistical methods, 
repeated use of Baye's Theorem, or some other 
statistical method. The second framework does 
not require that agents know the model, although 
some of this work assumes that agents base their 
expectations on the basis of one model chosen 
fiom a set that includes the true model. 
11.  Learning When Agents Know the Model 
To illustrate a process of learning and its connec- 
tion to the stability of REE, we first examine one 
approach taken by Cyert and DeGroot (1974). 
They proposed to design models that describe 
the process by which rational expectations may 
develop within a market. They build on  a version 
of the cobweb model used by Muth (1961) to 
propose the concept of rational expectations. 
Muth posited a partial equilibrium model for a 
homogeneous good with a production lag. Using 
the notation of Bray and Savin (1986), the market 
equations have the following form in any period t: 
(1)  dt =  m, - m,pt  (demand) 
(2)  st=m,+m5p,'+v2,  (supply) 
(3)  dt = st  (equilibrium), 
where mo , m, , m2  ,  and m5 are fmed parameter 
values; p, is the market-clearing price of the 
good; p;  is the market-anticipated price before 
trade takes place; and v2 , is an exogenous shock 
to supply. It is assumed that all units demanded 
are consumed in period t and that firms make 
production decisions before trade takes place. 
Thus, the deterministic component of supply is 
fxed in period t. 
The assumption of market clearing 
yields: 
(4)  pt = M-ap;  +  u,, 
where M = (m, - mo)mjl, a =  m5ms1 and 
u = -rn-lU 
2  21' 
Under the usual assumption of  rational expecta- 
tions, the market-anticipated price equals the 
objective mathematical expectation for price 
given the model and as conditioned on the data 
available when the expectation was formed.3 That 
is, p,' =  Et - ,(p,). Cyert and Degroot propose a 
similar basis for determining p;  They assume 
that expectations are consistent, meaning that the 
firms' expectations are based on the mechanism 
implied by the model. The essence of this dis- 
tinction is that while agents are presumed to 
know the correct likelihood functions, they are 
not required to know the parameter values. Cyert 
and DeGroot derive an explicit expression for 
market-anticipated price by taking expections of 
both sides of (4), substituting p,' for Et - ,(pt) 
and solving for p;: 
(5)  Et -,M-Et-, [utI 
P,'  = 
1  + Et- ,(a) 
Note that since the parameter 
values are unknown, the market-anticipated price 
is expressed in terms of expected values of the 
parameters, not true values. Agents (firms) learn 
to form rational expectations if, with additional 
data, the expected values of the parameters con- 
verge to their true values. Note also that market- 
anticipated price will differ fiom actual market 
13 
It is perhaps more accurate to call such expectations model- 
consistent instead of "rational." (See  Simon 1978). 
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price both because of expectional error and the 
supply shock. 
The economic process evolves as 
follows: In each period, the firms form consistent 
expectations of  the price in the next period h-om 
(5) based on expected parameter values (priors). 
The actual price is then generated according to 
the model incorporating the consistent expecta- 
tions, that is, price is given by (4). The observed 
values of actual price contains new information 
that leads firms to change their expectations of 
the values of the parameters and, hence, to 
change their expectations of the price in the fol- 
lowing period. The actual price in the next 
period is again generated by the model and the 
process continues in this manner. 
Cyert and DeGroot verify that such 
a process can, in fact, converge to REE  when 
slope coefficients m,  and m5 are known, even if 
intercepts m, and m,  are not. In this example, 
the authors assume that the random (supply 
intercept) error has a normal distribution with 
mean 0  and known precision (inverse of var- 
iance). Moreover, they posit a posterior distribu- 
tion for M at the end of period t-1  that is normal 
with finite mean and precision. Finally, they show 
that a Bayesian updating of parameter values does 
converge to the true value of  M. 
The convergence result was 
encouraging. It showed that one need not 
assume all knowledge is innate, but that, h-om a 
Bayesian point of view, the relationship between 
expectations and other variables in the model 
arises naturally when economic agents form 
expectations in a manner internally consistent 
with the mechanism generating the data. In sim- 
ple terms, this means that agents can learn 
parameter values even though their expectations 
affect outcomes of the model. An essential 
assumption is that all agents can correctly specify 
likelihood functions of unknown parameters, that 
is, that they "know" the structure of the model. 
An  implicit assumption underlying 
this and all other models obtaining convergence 
when agents know the model is that the solution 
concept being employed is Nash equilibria. This 
means that each agent has no reason to alter his 
specification of the likelihood function, given his 
own specification and those of all other agents. 
Thus, the approach assumes not only that agents 
know the model, but also that agents know that 
other agents know the model. The implications of 
this are discussed by Blume, Bray, and Easley 
(1982): 
The concept of a Nash equilibrium in 
learning strategies has much to commend 
it. Any other learning process is to some 
degree ad hoc; if some or all of the agents 
are learning by using mis-specified mod- 
els, at some stage they should realize this 
and change the specification. Nash equilib- 
ria in learning strategies are rational expec- 
tations equilibria in which agents take into 
account their uncertainty about features of 
the world which they are assumed to know 
in standard models of rational expectations 
equilibria. However, Nash equilibria in 
learning strategies are liable to be consid- 
erably more informationally demanding 
than conventional rational expectations 
equilibria, as agents require extensive 
knowledge about the structure and dynam- 
ics of the model that prevails while they 
learn. There may also be problems with 
the existence of equilibrium. Thus, while 
this approach yields convergence to a con- 
ventional rational expectations equilib- 
rium, its extreme informational demands 
make it an unsatisfactory answer to the 
initial question of how agents learn how to 
form rational expectations. (p.3  15) 
In sum, employing the Nash solu- 
tion concept begs the question as to how agents 
learn the structural form of the underlying model. 
Moreover, it provides no economic justification for 
why any agent should believe that all other agents  5 
will know what forecast methods other agents 
use. What incentives are there for such behavior? 
IU. Leaming When Agents Don't Know the Model 
When agents know the structural form of the 
economy, it is a relatively straightfoxward task to 
identify informational requirements sufficient to 
obtain convergence to REE. As  we have seen, 
however, these requirements are quite demand- 
ing. They presume that agents have extensive 
knowledge about what other agents believe as 
they all learn about the parameters. It is some- 
what interesting, however, that in situations 
where agents don't know the model, convergence 
can occur under somewhat weaker assumptions 
about the learning process. These results, how- 
ever, are model specific. Other, equally reason- 
able, approaches lead to instability of REE. 
Achieving convergence depends not only on the 
nature of learning but on the structural and sto- 
chastic parameters of the underlying model. 
When agents don't know the 
model, the problem of learning has been 
addressed in two distinct ways. The first approach 
provides an explicit model that allows agents to 
modify their forecasting rules in light of observa- 
ble outcomes (see Blume and Easley [1982]). 
Typically, they choose among a set of models that 
includes the true one. Convergence occurs when 
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all agents eventually adopt the true model. In this 
approach, we find that the results are mixed. In 
some models, rational expectations equilibria are 
locally stable but not unique. 
The second approach examines the 
possibility of convergence when agents never 
switch models, despite the fact that they may 
have misspecified the model while they are learn- 
ing. Essentially, this approach considers whether 
"irrational" learning can lead to rational expecta- 
tions equilibrium. 
An interesting model by Bray and 
Savin (1986) examines the second kind of learn- 
ing. An appealing feature of this model is that 
agents learn using conventional techniques- 
such as by estimating the parameters of a stand- 
ard linear-regression model. While this is the cor- 
rect econometric specification for their postulated 
model in equilibrium, the econometric model is 
misspecified while people are learning. Moreover, 
Bray and Savin use simulations to examine the 
rate at which convergence takes place and to 
assess the possibility that agents discover that 
their estimated model is misspecified. 
Following Townsend (1978), they 
extend the cobweb model to include stochastic 
demand, to allow for exogenous shocks to aggre- 
gate supply, and to accommodate diversity of firm 
expectations and decisions. All firms are assumed 
to face the same technology as defined by a 
quadratic cost function 
where m5 > 0 and qi, is the output of firm i at 
date t. Under the profit-maximizing postulate, 
firm i chooses an output level equal to m5ppt 
where pp,  is the mean of its prior on market- 
anticipated price.4 
The aggregate of these expecta- 
tions over all firms is denoted as pf.  Their model 
is thus given by: 
(6)  d, =  m, - m2p,  +  vl ,  (demand) 
(7)  s,  =  m ,P f +  x;m4  v,  ,,  (supply) 
(8)  d,=s,  (equilibrium), 
where x; m4 +  v2, is an exogenous supply shock 
and xi  is observable. Market clearing implies that: 
where x,'  is redefined to include 1 as the first 
component and m = [m,:  m,]  mjl and as in (4) 
a =  m,mil ,but u, =  (v,, - v2,)mj1. 
......................................... 
Bray and Savin consider a continuum of firms producing a homo- 
genous good. The  set of firms is the unit interval [0,1]  indexed by 
i.  Thus, market-anticipated  price is a Lebesque intergral. It is in that 
sense an average expected price. 
If agents knew both the model 
structure and the values of the parameters, the 
REE  price forecast would be: 
for all  i,  assuming a # 1. Together (9) and (10) 
imply that the REE  price, for each t, is: 
(11)  p, =  x;m(l-a)-'  +  u,. 
The linear relationship between actual price and 
exogenous-supply influences applies only in 
equilibrium when agents all share the same 
expectations. This simple relationship does not 
hold when agents are learning the values of the 
parameters. To illustrate this, Bray and Savin 
assume agents maintain the hypothesis that: 
satisfies the assumptions of the standard linear 
model, and estimate b accordingly. They con- 
sider the consequences that agents may be classi- 
cal or Bayesian statisticians. If all agents (firms) 
are Bayesian statisticians who assume u, is 
i.i.d as N(o,&,  and if firm i's initial prior on 
b is b,,  and prior on precision is so/u2,  firm 
i may obtain revised priors on b after observing 
(x, ,p,  ),  .  . .,(x,-, ,p,-,  ),  which will have mean 
b, ,,-,  , and precision St-,  /a2  where, 
and 
Note that the classical statistician is essentially a 
Bayesian Statistician whose initial prior on b is 
diffuse (So =  0). 
With this revised prior, agent i's 
forecast of p, is p?,  = x ;bit.  The aggregate of 
market-anticipated price is p:  = x ;  b,  where b,  is 
an aggregate of bit over all firms. Substituting this 
in (9) gives: 
(14)  p, =  x;(m  + ab,,  ) +  u,. 
Equation (14) generates the actual 
observed price given both the market mechanism 
and the way agents form expectations. Note that 
the coefficient of x,-, , (m +  ab,,  ), varies with 
time. Thus, agents are incorrectly assuming that 
price is generated by a standard linear model 
with a constant coefficient. The model is incor- 
rect because it fails to take account of the effects 
of learning on the parameter values. If agents 
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knew what we know, they would not use linear 
regressions to form expectations. 
Despite the fact that agents may 
misspecify the model, Bray and Savin are able to 
show that: (1) the difference between the indi- 
vidual estimates bit and the average estimate 
6, tends to zero with probability one as t tends 
to infinity; and (2) the average estimate 6, cannot 
converge to any value other than the REE  value 
rn (1-a)-' . The intuition they offer is that if  b, 
tends to b for large t, the actual price is p, = 
x;(m  +  ba)  +  u,. Since the data generation 
process closely approximates the standard linear 
model with coefficient rn  +  ba, the estimate 
b,  tends to m +  ba, which is impossible unless 
b =  m(1-a)-'. 
These results enable Bray and 
Savin to obtain the restrictions on parameters a 
and b that are necessary and sdcient  for exis- 
tence, uniqueness, and 'stability' of the REE. The 
conditions are precisely the same conditions for 
the existence, uniqueness, and tantonnement 
stability of a market in which supply and demand 
are simultaneous, that is, a Walrasian model in 
which supply at time t is based on actual price at 
t as opposed to market-anticipated price. 
The intuition behind the conver- 
gence process of the Bray-Savin model is straight- 
forward. Suppose suppliers' beliefs are such that, 
in the aggregate, they underestimate price cor- 
responding to a given set of exogenous influences. 
This would lead them to supply less than they 
otherwise would have done. Consequently, the 
auction would assure that the market-clearing 
price would be above the market-anticipated 
price. Taking account of the newly observed 
price, suppliers would, on average, raise their 
estimate of price corresponding to the same set 
of exogenous influences. Provided they don't 
overreact, learning would bring them closer to 
REE  in each successive period. 
An  important feature of the Bray- 
Savin approach is that the specified learning pro- 
cess is reasonably simple and plausible despite 
the fact that the underlying mechanism is much 
more complicated. A potential problem, however, 
is that agents might discover that they have incor- 
rectly specified the model. Since the estimated 
model is not the true one while they are learning, 
the data may confirm the misspecification. On the 
other hand, if convergence is sufficiently fast, 
their test may fail to spot the misspecification. 
To examine this possibility, Bray 
and Savin use computer simulations. The simula- 
tions suggest that the rate of convergence can be 
slow if the ratio of the slopes of demand and 
supply are near the boundary of the stability 
region, especially if  the initial prior mean is 
incorrect for REE  and the prior precision is high. 
Thus, the fact that equilibrium may be stable may 
not mean much. Equilibrium behavior may not 
provide a reasonable enough approximation of 
the actual behavior to be meaningful. 
Bray and Savin also use the simula- 
tions to examine the likelihood that agents will dis- 
cover that their estimated model is misspecified. 
Agents are presumed to examine the Durbin- 
Watson statistic as a diagnostic check for model 
misspecification. The results suggest that if REE  is 
stable, and if  the estimates converge rapidly, 
agents are unlikely to identify the misspecification. 
Thus, it is reasonable to expect that agents could 
persist using simple linear (misspecified!) meth- 
ods and eventually learn all they need to know to 
form expectations in a manner consistent with REE. 
IV.  The Meaning of  Stability 
The major contribution of the learning models 
discussed above is that they provide an explicit 
kamework for describing a transition process 
toward equilibrium of a system disturbed by 
some random shocks.5 While they successfully 
demonstrate how rational expectations may 
develop in a perfectly competitive market, learr- 
ing models do not provide the kind of underpin- 
nings sought by general equilibrium theorists in 
stability analysis. They focus only on the devel- 
opment of expectational equilibrium. No attempt 
is made to specify the dynamics of price forma- 
tion. Rather, the kamework implicitly assumes an 
auction process not substantively different from 
that required to achieve standard competitive 
(Walrasian) equilibrium. 
Thus, these models beg the central 
question that continues to plague general equilib- 
rium theorists: how to derive behavioral founda- 
tions for price adjustment. This is not a criticism 
specific to the models at hand, but is a fundamen- 
tal problem with all equilibrium models, including 
fixed-price models. To appreciate the problem, it 
is useful to review briefly the theoretical founda- 
tions of the stability of competitive equilibrium. 
Stability analysis of competitive 
equilibrium builds on the earliest notions about 
price adjustment, which were imbedded in the 
"law of supply and demand." It essentially holds 
that in competitive markets, prices will rise when 
there is excess demand and fall when there is 
It is the view of  Cyert and DeGroot that such a process has to be 
developed if the rational hypothesis is to be a scientific truth 
rather than a religious belief.  I 
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excess supply. This argument has the familiar 
dynamic formulation first proposed by Samuelson 
in 1941 (see 1947): 
dP  (15) -  =  h (D  -  S), h (0)  = 0, and h'  > 0 and 
dt 
where D and S are quantities demanded and 
supplied for a homogeneous good; p is the 
market price of that good, and a is an exogenous 
shift parameter. The properties of the static de- 
mand and supply functions are derived under the 
standard hypothesis that households and firms 
maximize familiar objective functions. Formal 
proofs for the stability of competitive markets 
essentially derive sufficient conditions for the 
dynamic relations expressed by (15) to yield time 
paths of prices that approach their equilibrium 
values from arbitrary points6 Unfortunately, glo- 
bal stability is obtained only under very severe 
restrictions on excess demand functions, the 
most notable being the assumption that all goods 
be gross substitutes. 
While the assumption implicit in 
(15) seems plausible, it is beset by some impor- 
tant conceptual difficulties. The first problem is 
that (15) has never been deduced as the maxi- 
mizing response of economic agents to changing 
data. Sonnenschein (1973) has shown that the 
standard assumptions about individual behavior 
do  not imply any restrictions on excess demand 
functions beyond homogeneity of degree zero 
and Walras' Law-conditions not sufficient for 
stability. Thus, adjustment to Walrasian equilib- 
rium lacks the rigorous basis that is accorded to 
the properties of static supply and demand func- 
tions. Moreover, it is not clear who changes prices 
when the system is not in equilibrium. In com- 
petitive equilibrium, sellers and buyers are typi- 
cally treated as price takers. Therefore, it is pre- 
sumed that there is some implicit market 
manager who sets price. 
The idea of a market manager 
whose behavioral rule for price adjustment is 
given by (15) was, of course, the ingenious 
answer given by Walras. This approach is tanta- 
mount to an assumption that all consumers and 
suppliers gather in one place. The market mana- 
ger quotes a set of prices for each commodity. 
Then each trader writes on a piece of paper (a tic- 
ket) the amounts of each of the commodities he 
wishes to buy or sell at the given set of prices. If 
there is excess demand for the commodity i,  the 
manager raises the price of  i,  if  there is an excess 
supply for commodity  J;  he lowers the price of 
See Arrow and Humicz, (1958) and Arrow, Humicz, and Block  I  6 (199, 
j.  Each time a new set of prices is quoted, each 
trader submits a revised ticket. The process con- 
tinues until excess demand is zero, that is, equil- 
ibrium price is determined. Until then no trade 
orproduction takesplace.7  Essentially, this is a 
description of a timeless process by which market 
clearing can be achieved and thus fails to help in 
understanding the dynamics of price. 
The only difference between this 
Walrasian situation and the one implied by the 
Bray-Savin model is that, under the latter, suppli- 
ers commit to production levels prior to trade. 
Suppliers therefore must base their decisions for 
output levels on the anticipated price for their 
good. While these anticipated prices may initially 
differ when suppliers use Bayesian learning 
models, the observed market-clearing price at any 
point in time must be the same for all suppliers. 
Because the model used by suppliers to deter- 
mine anticipated price specifies the single market- 
clearing price as the dependent variable, a tan- 
tonnement process is necessary to generate data 
that is essential for the process to be operational. 
Clearly, the auction process plays an essential 
role in consolidating information that is necessary 
for convergence. 
A key distinction between the Bray- 
Savin process and a pure Walrasian process in- 
volves a restriction on what suppliers can learn 
about the aggregate supply function. In a standard 
Walrasian auction, suppliers are free to adjust the 
quantities they would produce for all the prices 
quoted. In this way, the auction process also syn- 
thesizes for all agents all the relevant properties 
about both aggregate supply and demand. In the 
Bray-Savin model, on the other hand, suppliers 
offer the same quantity for all prices quoted. The 
auction essentially determines the point on  the de- 
mand curve that corresponds to the predetermined 
level of output. That is, the auction synthesizes 
only responses of consumers to the array of price 
quotes. Suppliers learn from the (temporaty) 
equilibrium price about whether they under or 
overestimated prices, but they do  not know how 
well other suppliers estimated prices and, conse- 
quently, how aggregate supply might adjust to 
different prices. This information is revealed only 
through a succession of auction outcomes. 
Notwithstanding information lags, 
the situation in the Bray-Savin model may not be 
very plausible for markets where prices are not 
7 
The  requirement that no  trade take place before equilibrium is 
determined is essential if such a process is to converge to a 
unique equilibrium. Fisher (1983) shows how trading at "false" prices 
affects endowments of  agents and, hence,  the ultimate outcome of the 
process. Thus equilibrium would depend not only on initial endowments, 
but also on  the process that achieves equilibrium. Such a property is 
sometimes called hystersis. 
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determined by auction processes, even though 
the markets may appear competitive. Arrow 
(1959) noted that there is an inconsistency 
between the assumptions required of individuals 
in a state of equilibrium and those necessary to 
explain behavior in disequilibrium. He argued 
that, in situations of excess demand, firms do not 
behave as price takers but, in fact, use price- 
setting tactics similar to the profit-maximizing  tac- 
tics of a monopolist. 
The problem is somewhat more 
complex in that a firm's competitors will also be 
raising prices. Moreover, on an individual basis, 
no  seller would have the incentive to agree to an 
auctioneer, since the market-clearing price would 
be less than what he could obtain in disequilib- 
rium. In situations of excess supply, Arrow shows 
that firms are still monopolists, but buyers are 
monopsonists; thus, it is a joint decision that 
establishes price. The lesson is that disequilib- 
rium price adjustment may need to recognize 
elements of imperfect competition. 
Theories of imperfect competition 
require elements of strategic behavior, that is, 
situations in which two or more agents choose 
strategies that interdependently affect each other. 
Such problems involve game theory. Arrow 
(1986) recently concluded that analysis of games 
with structures that are extended over time leads 
to very weak implications-in the sense that 
there are a continua of equilibria. The fact is that 
we know very little about how economic man 
interacts with other economic men in situations 
of excess demand or supply. Unfortunately, the 
learning models considered above provide no 
shortcuts around this problem. 
V.  Learning in the Macroeconomy 
While Bray-Savin learning shows that agents using 
"plausible" models can "learn their way" to REE 
in auction markets, it is doubtful that such a 
result could obtain for a highly decentralized 
market economy. This section identifies some dif- 
ficulties, apart from the problems of modeling 
strategic behavior, that confront a modeler seek- 
ing to extend the Bray-Savin result to the macro- 
economy. The issues are sketched using a notion 
of equilibrium proposed by Frank Hahn (1973). 
It is the essence of a decentralized 
economy that individuals have different informa- 
tion.8 Furthermore, each individual is specialized 
in certain activities and has, in general, special- 
ized knowledge about those activities. There is no 
reason to believe that individuals base their expec- 
tations on the rather general kind of information 
that econometricians use. Instead, different indi- 
viduals base their decisions on different sets of 
information. In short, a "plausible" model of 
learning in macroeconomics would need to incor- 
porate the existence of heterogenous information. 
The problem of learning when 
agents have incomplete and different information 
has recently been studied by Marcet and Sargent 
(1986b).9 In their approach, agents use least- 
squares estimation to formulate expectations that 
they think are relevant to understanding the under- 
lying law of motion as it affects them. Marcet and 
Sargent assume that agents do not respecify their 
regressions over time, but maintain the same 
"theory" about the world they observe. As with 
Bray-Savin, their model accommodates feedback 
from agent expectations to the actual law of 
motion of the system. Marcet and Sargent show 
that the existence of informational asymmetries 
does not preclude convergence to REE when the 
law of motion is a linear stochastic process. 
While the class of learning models 
studied by Marcet and Sargent imposes some re- 
strictions on the economic environment, the  9 
mechanism can accommodate a wide class of 
economic theories. Nothing inherent in the least- 
squares learning schemes precludes convergence 
to a non-Walrasian equilibrium. 
The idea that an economic system 
might converge to a non-Walrasian equilibrium 
is, no doubt, difficult to accept for some econo- 
mists. For example, won't arbitrage opportunities 
arise?  Although there would be such opportuni- 
ties vis-a-vis a Walrasian ideal, it is not evident 
that agents can perceive the ideal to identify the 
opportunities. Because agents don't observe con- 
tinuous market-clearing equilibrium outcomes in 
a non-Walrasian environment, there is no reason 
that their expectations will ever become consis- 
tent with Walrasian equilibrium in the long run. 
The point here is that agents' ex- 
pectations could  become consistent with the 
conventions (including price-setting mecha- 
nisms) that determine the laws of motion of the 
system. While equilibrium expectations would 
not be systematically inconsistent with observed 
outcomes of the model, agent choices would not 
necessarily be Pareto-optimal. Nevertheless, to the 
extent that market forces operate, it is conceiva- 
ble that price-setting conventions could develop 
This point and the following were made by Arrow (1978) as a crit-  .  '  '  * '  '  . '  .  * . .  * ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '  * '  ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
icism of  the use of Muthian expectations to the aggregate 
economy.  1  I  9 See  Marcent and Sargent (1986a). 
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that would lead to an equilibrium that is "approx- 
imately c~mpetitive."~~ 
To understand what "approximately 
competitive:' might mean, it is useful to introduce 
a notion of equilibrium proposed by Hahn 
(1973). In Hahnian equilibrium, each agent holds 
his own theory about the way the economy will 
develop and about the consequences of his own 
actions." The agent abandons his theory when it 
produces systematic and persistent errors. To the 
extent the agent maintains a theory, his actions 
are conditioned on his perceptions about the 
laws of motion of such a system. The agent is 
said to be in equilibrium when he maintains his 
theory. The economy is said to be in equilibrium 
if  it doesn't produce outcomes systematically  and 
persistently inconsistent with agents' perceptions. 
In the context of Marcet-Sargent 
learning, the theories agents hold are embodied in 
the regressors they choose. Under the assumption 
that the true law of motion is linear, agents will 
dtimately not be able to falsify their theories.'* 
Thus, they would have no reason to abandon the 
theory. In the context of Hahn's notion, each 
agent would be considered in equilibrium. 
Moreover, since the actual outcomes would not 
be inconsistent with predictions of agents' theor- 
ies, the economy would be in equilibrium. 
Although Hahn was not completely 
precise about his notion of equilibrium, he 
clearly intended it to be more general than the 
equilibrium obtained in Marcet-Sargent learning. 
For Hahn, the structure of true "laws of motion" 
need not be independent of the theories agents 
choose. The theories could determine the stmc- 
ture of the laws of motion-a structure that could 
have nonlinearities that agents could never com- 
prehend. In the model of Sargent and Marcet, the 
underlying structure is constrained to obey a lin- 
ear (stochastic) law of motion. 
Another important difference is 
that Hahnian equilibrium would accommodate 
agent behavior that could be inconsistent at any 
10 
The meaning of "approximately  competitive"  equilibrium devel 
oped below is different from the sense that allocations in the 
core are said to be approximately competitive. The  latter refers to out- 
comes of  a bargaining process, while the former refers to outcomes 
derived from habitual behavior that allows agents to "survive" in a com- 
petitive economy. 
Clearly, this notion abstracts from many difficult problems  1  1  posed by strategic behavior For a more complek descripibn 
of Hahn's notion of equilibrium and a comparison to the Austrian view, 
see Littlechild (1982). 
It is not evident that agents would maintain their theories in  1  2 the early stages of learning  For any given mode one might 
want to provide sensitivity analysis a-la Bray-Savin. 
point in time, but not persistently so. In the 
Marcet-Sargent limit point, agents ultimately learn 
enough so that their expectational error is white 
noise, that is, agent actions lead to a steady-state 
equilibrium. This means that agent expectations 
would ultimately become mutually consistent in 
every period, given what they can know. Because 
Hahn only imposes that actions (expectations) of 
agents not be systematically andpwsfitently in- 
consistent, his equilibrium would not be unique. 
Hence, at any point in time, equilibrium would 
be distinct from a steady state. Local stability 
would mean that, for short enough periods and 
for small enough disturbances, the set of equilibria 
is large but that it shrinks. 
It is useful to stress here that the 
agents in the Hahnian concept of equilibrium are 
rational in the spirit of McCallum's intuition. That 
is, agents do not maintain their "theory" when 
systematic errors are sufficiently persistent for fal- 
sification of the theory. However, the meaning of 
rationality is much less restrictive (hence more 
plausible) than is presumed in conventional for- 
mulations of rational expectations. Agents in 
Hahnian equilibrium are rational only in a subjec- 
tive sense. Nothing inherent in the Hahnian 
approach would assure that aggregate economic 
outcomes would converge to a stationary stochas- 
tic process with a unique objective  probability 
distribution. Without such convergence, agents' 
subjective expectations could not coincide with 
an objective expectation of aggregate outcomes. 
Imposing the restriction that agents' subjective 
expectations be mutually consistent with each 
other and with a particular objective  probability 
distribution underlying a given model seems too 
restrictive to be very useful in practice. This point 
has been developed in an alternative model pro- 
posed by Swamy, Barth, and Tinsley (1982113 
An attractive feature of Hahnian 
equilibrium concept is that it can accommodate 
more plausible market structures such as the 
"approximately competitive" economy suggested 
above. Agents may adopt stable reaction rules that 
allow them to cope in a competitive environment 
without requiring unreasonable computational 
abilities necessary for analyzing the aggregative 
.......................................... 
13 
Swamy el. al., show how confounding 'objective' and 'subjec- 
tive' notions of probability may violate the axiomatic basis of 
statistical theory. They propose an alternative model for aggregation of 
subjective expectations. The problem with conventional formulations of 
the rational expectations hypothesis in macroeconomic models lies not 
with the concept of individual rationality but with the context in which it 
is developed-namely in the representative agent model. Once one 
allows agents to differ both in the information they have and in the  the- 
ories they hold, a model can accommodate arbitrage opportunities that 
are deemed essential for a process leading to a rational expectations 
equilibrium. How agents learn to recognize arbitrage opportunities, how- 
ever, remains an open, but difficult, issue. 
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impacts of strategic behavior. Moreover, the 
equilibrium of such a model would accommo- 
date a wide variety of nonstationarities in the vari- 
ables. Nevertheless, Hahnian equilibrium too has 
some severe limitations. 
A key difficulty for a researcher 
modeling approximately competitive environ- 
ments is that an infinite set of plausible conven- 
tions could be developed that would lead to 
"model consistent" (rational, in the sense of 
Hahn?) expectations. This may not be relevant for 
the individual agent in Hahnian equilibrium. The 
agent could be satisfied with his own conven- 
tions for dealing in his specialized corner of the 
world. A macromodeler, on the other hand, may 
not have access to all relevant information. His 
estimates of underlying relationships would be 
inconsistent because of omission of relevant 
explanatory variables bias. Thus, it may be impos- 
sible for a modeler of aggregate economic activ- 
ity to discover adequately the law of motion for 
the economy as a whole, even when the econ- 
omy is in Hahnian equilibrium. This, of course, is 
the essence of the Austrian criticism of macro- 
economics, both Keynesian and New Classical.'* 
The most difficult problem for 
modeling learning in an approximately competi- 
tive model, however, is the situation in which 
agents change theories.15 In the context of 
Hahnian equilibrium, this is the problem of glo- 
bal stability. That is, when a shock to equilibrium 
is so big, it causes agents to change their theories. 
Hahn argued that it is impossible to make any 
claims about global stability. He concluded that 
this limitation was imposed by the current state 
of economic knowledge. Economists know very 
little about how agents adapt to a changing eco- 
nomic environment. 
When confronted with the limits of 
equilibrium analysis, economists are often more 
willing to invoke a convenient fiction than to 
modify their fundamental tools. The urge to close 
the model typically prevails over a venture into a 
methodological frontier.  As is often noted, some 
people searching for a lost wallet at night prefer 
to look under a street lamp even though it may 
......................................... 
14 
Another way of  looking at the same problem is that the 
specification of "approximately competitive" behavior in this 
paper is too general to have empirical content. Nevertheless, the 
researcher is free to specify his own set of conventions-provided,  of 
course,.  that they are logically consistent. Because of  the difficulties in 
falsifying economic theories, one might choose among alternative speci- 
fications on  the basis of out-of-sample forecasts. The foundations of 
such a method are found in Swamy, Conway, and von zur Muehlen 
(1985). 
be more likely that they lost the wallet in the dark 
alley. Hahn's proposed reformulation of equilib- 
rium was useful in illuminating the problems of 
learning in a large, decentralized economy. In 
this sense, it demonstrates the potential value of 
building new streetlamps. 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper opened with the idea that rational, 
purposeful individuals have incentives to weed 
out systematic errors in their own expectations. 
Thus, it is argued that economic models should 
not allow expectational errors to persist. Conven- 
tional formulations of rational expectations, 
which assume Walrasian market-clearing,  do not 
violate this restriction. The implicit auction pro- 
cess works to assure that all decisions are mutu- 
ally consistent both with what agents can know 
about the model and with the underlying model. 
This paper presented the Bray- 
Savin result that shows that agents may use "plau- 
sible" learning mechanisms to "learn their way" 
to rational expectational equilibrium in auction 
markets. Thus, learning models extend the results 
of tatonnement stability analysis to situations  11 
where agents form model-consistent expectations 
about the environment they are in. The restriction 
that economic models not permit systematic 
expectational errors to persist, however, does not 
require that agents behave in a mutually consis- 
tent manner in each period of time as in Walra- 
sian equilibrium. The restriction is weaker than 
that and hence allows for a broader scope in the 
meaning of rationality than is generally considered 
in conventional formulations of the rational 
expectations hypothesis. That is, the restriction 
allows a broader class of economic models than 
the Walrasian economy. 
The model of "approximately 
competitive"  equilibrium sketched in this paper 
illustrates one potential subclass of such models. 
The sketch provides a plausible example of how 
rational, self-seeking agents might "learn their 
way" to non-Walrasian equilibria. Without an auc- 
tioneer in each and every market, a modeler can- 
not rule out such equilibria apriori simply by 
assuming agents have incentives to weed out sys- 
tematic expectational errors. 
I  15 
This is what Hahn calls leaming. It is also the sense of learn- 
ing examined by  Blume and Easley. 
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